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Strong Social Distancing
Measures In The United
States Reduced The COVID-19
Growth Rate
ABSTRACT State and local governments imposed social distancing
measures in March and April of 2020 to contain the spread of novel
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). These included large event bans,
school closures, closures of entertainment venues, gyms, bars, and
restaurant dining areas, and shelter-in-place orders (SIPOs). We evaluated
the impact of these measures on the growth rate of confirmed COVID-19
cases across US counties between March 1, 2020 and April 27, 2020. An
event-study design allowed each policy’s impact on COVID-19 case growth
to evolve over time. Adoption of government-imposed social distancing
measures reduced the daily growth rate by 5.4 percentage points after
1–5 days, 6.8 after 6–10 days, 8.2 after 11–15 days, and 9.1 after 16–20
days. Holding the amount of voluntary social distancing constant,
these results imply 10 times greater spread by April 27 without SIPOs
(10 million cases) and more than 35 times greater spread without any of
the four measures (35 million). Our paper illustrates the potential danger
of exponential spread in the absence of interventions, providing relevant
information to strategies for restarting economic activity. [Editor’s Note:
This Fast Track Ahead Of Print article is the accepted version of the
peer-reviewed manuscript. The final edited version will appear in an
upcoming issue of Health Affairs.]
A
critical questionduring theCOVID-
19 pandemic is the effectiveness
of the social distancing policies
adopted by US states and localities
in bending the curve. Although
these policies take a variety of forms—such as
imposing shelter-in-place orders (SIPOs); re-
stricting dine-in at restaurants; closing other
non-essential business such as bars, entertain-
ment venues, and gyms; banning large social
gatherings; and closing public schools—their ef-
fectiveness depends critically on the cooperation
of the public. For example, although California’s
first-in-the-nation SIPO carries threats of fines
and incarceration, its effectiveness fundamental-
ly relies on social pressure.1 Compliance with so-
cial distancing orders appears to be related
to local income, partisanship, and political be-
liefs in the US; and compliance with self-quaran-
tines is related to potential losses in income in
Israel.2–4
Some epidemiological models forecast the
eventual number of COVID-19 cases and fatali-
ties based on untested assumptions about the
impact of social distancing policies in contem-
porary society. The widely cited Imperial College
model assumes contact outside the home, school
or workplace declines by 75 percent, school con-
tact rates are unchanged, workplace contact
rates fall by 25 percent, and household contact
rates rise by 25 percent.5 Another study assumes
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age contact rate by 38percent, basedon evidence
from the 1918 influenza pandemic.6
In the US the literature on models of social
distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic is
evolving rapidly, and at the time of our writing,
we were aware of several working papers that
examined the consequences of social distancing
policies. Recent work found significant effects
of stronger measures (like SIPOs) on movement
using difference-in-differences methods and
state-level data from Google.7 Similar findings
have been obtained in a study with SafeGraph
mobility data,8 although a different study using
PlaceIQ and SafeGraph data found strong
measures were not important.9 Another paper
used synthetic control methods to show that
California’s SIPO significantly reduced COVID-
19 cases.1 A study of SIPOs across the U.S. also
found a reduction in cases, aswell as higher rates
of staying home full-time.10 Other authors used
interrupted time-series methods and found that
early statewide social distancing measures were
associated with decreases in states’ COVID-19
growth rates, but later SIPOs did not lead to
further reductions.11
At issue is not whether isolationworks to limit
the spread of disease, but rather whether the
particular government restrictions designed to
encourage social distancing in the US reduced
spread relative to simply providing information
and recommendations. Individuals may volun-
tarily engage in avoidance behavior, such as
hand washing or wearing masks, once they fully
perceive the risks of contagion.12,13 Critics of
more stringent government measures highlight
Sweden’s less intrusive response to COVID-19,
although Sweden’s strategy is increasingly ques-
tioned.14 Rigorous empirical research is needed
to determine the impacts of the various aspects
of state and local governments’ responses in
the U.S.
Our work—which leveraged both state and
county policy variation and used a flexible event-
study method that allowed for effects to vary
across measures and over time—estimated the
impacts of four types of social distancing mea-
sures on confirmed COVID-19 case growth rates
through April 27, 2020. The reduced-form ap-
proach captures any potential pathways driven
by these mandates, including complementary
avoidance behaviors that the public may engage
in if these orders provide an informational shock
in addition to increasing social distancing.
Study Data And Methods
Study Data The unit of observationwas dailyUS
county/county equivalents. Although there are
3,142 counties in the US, official COVID-19 rec-
ords report New York City as a whole rather than
dividing it into five counties, reducing this num-
ber to 3,138. Our dataset tracked counties over
58 days from March 1, 2020 to April 27, 2020,
leading to a sample size of 182,004. We chose
March 1 as the start date because no new cases
were reported in the entire U.S. on most days in
January and February. The April 27 end date was
chosen to coincide with the first removal of one
of four types of restrictions we analyzed (the re-
opening of restaurants and other entertainment
facilities in Georgia).15 Each county observation
was weighted by population using 2018 esti-
mates from the United States Department of
Agriculture’s Economic Research Service.16
Outcome Of Interest We examined the daily
growth rate in confirmed COVID-19 cases at the
county level, which originated from the 2019
Novel Coronavirus COVID-19 Data Repository
provided by the Johns Hopkins Center for Sys-
tems Science and Engineering. This repository
collected data on COVID-19 cases worldwide
from a range of sources including government
and independent health institutions.17
The daily exponential growth rate was calcu-
lated as the natural log of cumulative daily
COVID-19 cases minus the log of cumulative dai-
ly COVID-19 cases on the prior day.We chose this
functional formbecause epidemiologicalmodels
predict exponential growth in the absence of
intervention. Percent growth in cases is identical
to percent growth in cases per capita since re-
ported county populations did not vary during
the sample period. The growth rate was multi-
plied by 100 and can be read as percentage point
changes. In computing the growth rate, we fol-
lowed a recent COVID-19 study and added one to
the case counts to avoid dropping counties that
started with zero cases.18
Covariates The data on the timing of state
and local government social distancing interven-
tions was gathered from a host of sources and
made available by Johns Hopkins University.19
Part A of the online appendix explains a few
corrections we made to the dates and provides
a list of state- and county-level policies used in
the analysis.20
We focused on four government-imposed in-
terventions: SIPOs, public school closures, bans
on large social gatherings, and closures of enter-
tainment-related businesses. For large gather-
ings, we used the date of the first prohibition
that was at least as restrictive as 500 people.
Most of the bans were much more restrictive:
95percent of the time (inourpopulation-weight-
ed sample) the prohibition extended to 50 peo-
ple. For entertainment-related businesses, we
used the date of the first closure of either restau-
rant dining areas (including bars) or gyms/
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entertainment centers. 96 percent of the time, if
one such prohibition was in place, the other was
in place as well.
We included control variables related to the
availability of COVID-19 tests. The same Data
Repository that provides cases also includes
daily counts of positive, negative, and pending
tests in each state on each day, which we added
together.17 To mirror our measure of cases, we
converted this testing variable to the exponential
daily growth rate of cumulative tests performed.
Since COVID-19 test results are generally not
available immediately, we also included the
one-day lag of this growth rate. Further lags
(out to 10 days) were considered but always sta-
tistically insignificant, so we did not include
them. Most states did not report any pending
tests, meaning that they did not officially record
tests until the results were obtained. This likely
explains the lack of a longer lag between testing
growth and case growth.
Methods We estimated the relationship be-
tween social distancing policies and the expo-
nential growth rate of confirmedCOVID-19 cases
using an event-study regression with multiple
treatments. Statistical analysis was conducted
using Stata MP (version 15). This approach is
akin to difference-in-differences but more flexi-
ble, as it interacts the treatment variables with
multiple indicators of time since implementa-
tion, thereby tracing out the evolution of the
treatment effects over time.21
For each of the four policies, we include seven
variables:whether itwas implemented 1–5, 6–10,
11–15, 16–20, or more than 20 days ago; and
whether itwill be implemented5–9or 10 ormore
days later. Implementation on the current day
through four days from now was, therefore, the
reference group. If a county never adopted the
policy, each of these variables was set to 0
throughout the sample period.
An event study model is particularly useful to
study the impact of social distancing policies
on COVID-19 cases for two reasons. First, after
accounting for the incubation period and time
betweenonsetof first symptomsandpositive test
result, such policies likely only affect official
cases after a considerable lag.22 Additionally,
the inclusion of variables reflecting future imple-
mentation allows for an analysis of pretreatment
trends. Since it is not plausible for policies that
have not yet been implemented to causally affect
current cases, finding such associations could
suggest misspecification. For instance, one
might expect counties with rapidly growing case
counts to be the most likely to enact these mea-
sures, leading to a reverse-causal relationship
between current cases and future policies that
would be detected by our model.
Each policy was implemented at least 10 days
after the start of the sample period and at least
20 days prior to the end. Therefore, each policy
contributes to the identifying variation for all
coefficients except those for more than 20 days
ago and 10 or more days from now. Since the
estimated policy effects at those two “catch-all”
time periods could partially reflect composi-
tional changes, they should therefore be inter-
preted with more caution than the estimates for
the other time intervals.
In addition to the testing controls discussed
above, the model also included fixed effects for
geography and time. County fixed effects ac-
counted for the likelihood that, even aside from
differences in policies, case growth rates may
have varied due to a number of county character-
istics. These characteristics include population
density and residents’ education, political orien-
tation, and age.3,4 Fixed effects for each day in
each of thenineU.S. CensusDivisions (522 fixed
effects in total) allowed for flexible underlying
trends ingrowth rates that could vary indifferent
parts of the country, helping to account for the
staggered nature of the outbreak across loca-
tions.23 We report 95% confidence intervals,
with standard errors robust to heteroskedastic-
ity and clustered by state, the level of most of the
policy variation. Part B of the appendix provides
the formal notation for the event-study model.20
Limitations There are several limitations to
our analysis. Official COVID-19 case counts are
known to understate the true prevalence of the
disease, as they do not include asymptomatic
carriers, those who are not ill enough to seek
medical care, and thosewho are unable to obtain
a test due to supply constraints.1 Nonetheless,
confirmed case counts are crucial to the Trump
administration’s “Opening Up America Again”
plan, which proposes either a “downward trajec-
tory of documented caseswithin a 14-day period”
or “downward trajectory of positive tests as a
percent of total tests within a 14-day period (flat
or increasing volumeof tests)” as criteria to loos-
ening social distancingmeasures.24Moreover, to
the extent that testing shortages led to only the
sickest individuals receiving them, official case
counts can loosely be interpreted as the preva-
lence of moderate-to-severe illnesses, a relevant
metric for policy purposes.
A related caveat is that, ideally, we would like
to be able to control more precisely for access to
testing. Available data only allowed us to control
for number of tests performed at the state, rather
than county, level. However, most of our policy
variation is at the state level, so state-level testing
should go a long way towards alleviating bias.
Additionally, number of tests performed is not
an ideal measure of the ease of obtaining a test
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because it also reflects the level of illness in the
community.
Also,wemight ideallywant to estimate a richer
econometric model. It would be interesting to
trace out the timing of impacts more exactly
and study the policies’ interactions with each
other or county characteristics. Future work
should also examine the impacts of other social
distancing policies such as closing public parks
and beaches, the requirement to wear masks in
public, restrictions on visitors innursinghomes,
state announcements of first cases or fatalities,
and federal government actions such as prohib-
iting international travel.9However, it is difficult
to include numerous correlated treatment vari-
ables without reducing precision to the point
where statistical inference is uninformative.
Finally, as is typical of observational data an-
alyses, we cannot rule out all possible threats to
causal inference. Numerous possible confound-
ers could vary across time and space, including
the other policies mentioned above, informal
encouragement by government officials to wear
masks or improve hygiene, changing business
practices, and social norms regarding distanc-
ing. That said, including Census-Division-by-
day and county fixed effects in our model and
examining pretreatment trends helped us to
push in the direction of causality.
Study Results
Descriptive Information Confirmed COVID-
19 cases grew rapidly during the sample period,
from just 30 on March 1 to 978,047 on April 27.
Part C of the appendix shows the number of
counties with any COVID-19 cases on each day.20
On March 1, the vast majority of counties had
zero cases, and across all days, 49 percent of
unweighted county-by-day observations were
zero. However, counties with zero cases tended
to have low populations, so our population
weights limited the influence of these counties
on the results.
Supplemental exhibit 1 illustrates the reach of
social distancing policies on the US population
over time.20 The SIPOwas generally the last poli-
cy to be implemented, and adoption was uni-
formly lower than theotherpolicies.OnMarch 1,
no jurisdiction had implemented all four mea-
sures. By March 22, nearly 25 percent of the
US population was covered by all the measures,
growing to approximately 65 percent by
March 29 and 95 percent by April 7, when the
last SIPO took effect.
Impact Of Social Distancing Policies Sup-
plemental exhibit 2 illustrates the coefficients
(and confidence intervals) for SIPOs and bans
on large gatherings derived from the event-study
model.20 Relative to the reference category of
0–4 days before implementation, SIPOs lead to
statistically significant (p < 0:01) reductions in
the COVID-19 case growth rate of 3.0 percentage
points after 6–10 days, 4.5 after 11–15 days, 5.9
after 16–20 days, and 8.6 from day 21 onward.
Because the model held constant the other types
of policies, these estimates shouldbe interpreted
as the additional effect of SIPOs beyond shutting
down schools, large gatherings, and entertain-
ment-related businesses. This additional effect
may come from either the requirement/strong
advisement to shelter-in-place aside from “es-
sential” activities or the accompanying closure
of any “non-essential” businesses that remained
open.We did not observe any statistically signifi-
cant “placebo” effects of SIPOs in the periods
prior to implementation, giving credence to a
causal interpretation of our main results. If any-
thing, the pre-trend appears to point upward,
which would make our estimates in the post-
treatment period conservative.
We found no evidence that bans on large social
gatherings influenced the growth rate. The point
estimates for banning gatherings were statisti-
cally insignificant (p > 0:56 in all cases). How-
ever, the 95% confidence intervals included re-
ductions of up to 3–6 percentage points, so the
lack of evidence of an effect should not be mis-
interpreted as clear evidence of no effect. Also,
the lack of a statistically significant reduction in
the post-treatment period could potentially be
due to an upward (though not statistically signif-
icant) pre-treatment trend. However, results
from the aforementioned event study with sepa-
rate variables for each day showed that the pre-
trend disappeared four days prior to implemen-
tation.
Supplemental exhibit 3 shows estimates for
the restaurant-and-entertainment-related busi-
nesses and school closings.20 Closing restaurant
dining rooms/bars and/or entertainment cen-
ters/gyms led to statistically significant reduc-
tions in the growth rate of COVID-19 cases in
all timeperiods after implementation (p < 0:05).
The estimated effect was 4.4 percentage points
after 1–5 days, 4.7 after 6–10 days, 6.1 after 11–15
days, 5.6 after 16–20 days, and 5.2 after 21 or
more. Prior to implementation, policies related
to businesses showed no effect on the growth
rate, again passing the “placebo” test.
In contrast, we found no evidence that school
closures influenced the growth rate. The point
estimates were never close to statistically signifi-
cant (p > 0:37 in all cases), but the 95% confi-
dence intervals meant that we could not rule out
reductions of up to 4–5 percentage points.
Adding the coefficient estimates for each poli-
cy gives the combined effect of implementing all
COVID-19
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four social distancing policies. In days 1–5 after
implementation, the bundle of restrictions re-
duced the growth rate of COVID-19 cases by
5.4 percentage points. In days 6–10 after imple-
mentation, the growth rate fell by 6.8 percentage
points. This reduction grew to 6.8 percentage
points after 6–10 days, 8.2 percentage points
after 11–15, 9.1 after 16–20, and 12.0 after 21
or more. As discussed previously, the estimate
for 21+ days should be viewed with caution, as it
did not utilize the same geographic balance of
treatments as the estimates for the other time
intervals. A conservative interpretation of these
results would therefore be that the impact
reached 9.1 percentage points after 16–20 days
andappeared to remainat least ashighafter that.
Robustness Checks Part D of the appendix
presents and discusses results from a number of
robustness checks designed to address possible
concerns with our model.20 These checks begin
with regressionswith just one variable per policy
to help rule out the null results for gathering
bans and school closures being due to multicol-
linearity (appendix exhibit 4).20 We then evalu-
ated robustness to using different functional
forms for the testing controls or omitting them
(appendix exhibit 5).20 Next, appendix exhibit 6
varied the sample start date and the approach
used to dealing with counties with no cases.20
Appendix exhibit 7 shows results from dropping
the uniquely affected states of NY,WA, and CA.20
Appendix exhibit 8 displays results from a more
fine-grained event-study model with separate
variables for each day from 10 days before treat-
ment to 20 days after.20 Finally, appendix exhib-
it 9 presents results from other checks related to
data and measurement issues as well as control-
ling for county-specific pre-treatment trends.20
The general patternof resultswas robust to these
different specifications.
Counterfactual Simulations Supplemental
exhibit 420 uses the results from the baseline
model to compare the observed growth rate of
COVID-19 cases to two counterfactuals: 1) none
of the four social distancingmeasures ever being
imposed and2)noSIPOeverbeing imposed.The
process for creating these counterfactuals is de-
scribed in the appendix.20 Themean exponential
growth rate without any interventions was
16.2 percent over the full time period. The ob-
served and both counterfactual growth rates
peaked on March 19, 2020 at 26–28 percent
but started to diverge afterward, eight days after
the earliest restriction. Without any social dis-
tancing policies, the model predicts the case
growth rate would have stayed similarly high
for another week before gradually falling to
14 percent by April 27, 2020. Without SIPOs—
but keeping the other restrictions—the growth
rate would have fallen to 11 percent. The actual
growth rate, which reflects all implemented dis-
tancingpolicies includingSIPOs, fell to 3percent
by that date.
Supplemental exhibit 5 compares the reported
number of COVID-19 cases over time to the num-
ber of cases predicted by our event-study regres-
sion under these same two counterfactual sce-
narios.20 Part E of the appendix describes the
technical details of these simulations along with
the required assumptions.20 The graph uses the
natural logarithm of nationwide cases (or pre-
dicted cases) for the y-axis scale, but with corre-
sponding numbers labeled on the y-axis instead
of logs.
In all three scenarios, cases increased roughly
linearly on the log scale, as expected under
exponential growth, until the last week of
March—approximately two weeks after the first
restrictions and one week after the first SIPO.
The actual curve then began to flatten substan-
tially, eventually leading to 978,047 cases by
April 27. In contrast, the two counterfactual
curves only flattened slightly. By the end of the
sample period, the model predicts that cases
would have been 10 times higher without SIPOs
(10,224,598) and 35 times higher (35,257,098)
without any social distancing restrictions. Inter-
estingly, the closures of restaurants/entertain-
ment facilities accounted a larger share of the
reduction in cases than SIPOs, despite SIPOs
having larger coefficient estimates. This is be-
cause restaurant/entertainment facilities were
implemented earlier and in more places than
SIPOs.
Discussion
Nuance is requiredwhen interpreting the results
in supplemental exhibit 5.20 We view the simula-
tion as providing an illustration of the power of
exponential growth and the effectiveness of so-
cial distancing restrictions at “flattening the
curve,” even when their impacts are not imme-
diately visible. As late as April 6, nearly a month
after the earliest interventions, the number of
caseswould still havebeenunder 1,000,000even
without any restrictions—just 2.4 times the ac-
tual number of cases. The explosion in cases
without social distancing measures happens lat-
er, and by time it is happening, the lagged effects
of these measures mean it is too late to stop it.
At the same time,weurge caution about taking
the specific numbers of cases averted too literal-
ly. Simulations that use estimated parameters to
predict outside the range of observed policy var-
iation are inherently subject to a high level of
uncertainty that is difficult to quantify. More-
over, had policymakers not taken action and
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COVID-19 had continued to spread throughout
April in themanner depicted by our simulations,
voluntary social distancing by individuals and
businesses would have likely increased as panic
over the risingdeath toll andhospital overcrowd-
ing across the country mounted. In technical
terms, the Census-Division-by-day fixed effects
would have evolved differently than what we ob-
served.Thiswouldhave likely offset at least some
of the additional predicted cases—though, be-
cause of the lag to impact, it is unclear howmuch
of this offsetting could have occurred before the
end of our sample period.
Relatedly, testing shortages would likely have
prevented official case counts from reaching the
numbers presented in our simulations. Howev-
er, this is largely a semantic distinction, as these
infections would still be severe enough to war-
rant testing in the absence of a shortage. If any-
thing, not being confirmed as a COVID-19 case
could lead to inadequate treatment.
As striking as our counterfactual estimates
are, they still are not worst-case scenarios be-
cause they account for at least some voluntary
social distancing. Even without any government
restrictions, supplemental exhibit 420 illustrated
a 14.3 percentage point drop from the peak
growth rate to the end of the sample period.
The most plausible explanation is responses
of individuals and businesses to information
about the severity of the pandemic and federal
guidelines.
While our results suggest both SIPO and
non-SIPO measures can be effective at averting
COVID-19 cases, the lack of evidence of effects of
school closures or bans on large social gather-
ings is noteworthy.We cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that these null results are due to statisti-
cal imprecision, but it is also possible that both
policies may displace social interaction rather
than reducing it. For example, school closures
may have led families to continue social inter-
actions outside of the school setting, such as at
day care centers or parks. Google mobility data
through April 5, 2020 show increases of 10 per-
cent or more in visits to parks in 28 states.25 A
new study finds that schools are only slightly
more dangerous than parks and playgrounds
for COVID-19 transmission, supporting this ex-
planation.26 Alternatively, school closures pri-
marily affect children and the vast majority of
children experience mild symptoms and there-
fore may not be included in confirmed cases.27
While asymptomatic children can pass the virus
to adults who become more severely ill, our re-
sults imply that the extent to which this led to
confirmed cases did not change when schools
were closed.
Similarly, official group events may have sim-
ply been replaced by informal gatherings. Alter-
natively, official prohibitions may have been
largely redundant since the largest events (such
as college and professional sports) were already
being cancelled due to CDC guidance or other
information.
Also note that school closures and large event
bans occurred prior to the implementation of
SIPOs, meaning substitute types of social gath-
erings were still allowed. Our results, therefore,
should not be interpreted as a forecast about
what would happen if schools were reopened
or certain large gatherings were allowed while
other aspects of SIPOs remained in place.
Conclusion
We estimated the separate and combined impact
of four widely adopted social distancing policies.
Both SIPOs and closures of restaurants/bars/
entertainment-related businesses substantially
slowed the spread of COVID-19.We did not find
evidence that bans on large events and closures
of public schools also did, though the confidence
intervals cannot rule out moderately sized ef-
fects. Interestingly, two recent papers on the
effect of social distancing restrictions onmobili-
ty found the same pattern as we did in terms of
which restrictions mattered and which ones did
not, suggesting that null effects of gathering
bans and school closures on case growth are at
least plausible.7,8
Our contribution was to provide credible em-
pirical evidence on whether US social distancing
measures worked as intended in flattening the
curve. Estimating other important benefits and
costs from social distancing, including the total
lives saved and economic harm, was beyond the
scope of our study. Other work has attempted to
estimate job losses, simulate effects on the over-
all economy and economic growth, or estimate
distributional consequences from current and
past pandemics.1,6,28–31
Nonetheless, we provide important informa-
tion about benefits of social distancing for
policymakers to consider as they decide on strat-
egies for restarting economic activity. For in-
stance, our results argue against returning to
partial measures such as school closures and re-
strictions on large gatherings, while removing
the restrictions that prevent the redirection of
social activity to other settings. At issue moving
forward iswhethercases averted simply turn into
cases delayed, and a premature return to light
measures would make this more likely. At the
same time, our results are not informative about
the effectiveness of intermediatemeasures, such
as lifting a SIPO but requiringmasks in public or
opening restaurants at reduced capacity. Further
COVID-19
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research is needed as gradual, untested steps
toward reopening are takenacross the country.▪
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